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Shifting sands: nonlinearity, complexity and 
randomness in economics 
Donald A R George 
School of Economics, University of Edinburgh 
 
Abstract. The great crash of 2008 and the associated banking crisis have 
exposed the increasing irrelevance of much mainstream economics and 
provoked some economists to re-examine their discipline. Linear or linearised 
models with well-behaved additive stochastic disturbances, based on 
“microeconomic foundations” are no longer anywhere near adequate. 
Nonlinearity, complexity and randomness cannot be avoided, and the ideas of 
the British Emergentists have recently been given a new lease of life. Basing 
economics on algorithmic foundations provides a means of restoring genuine 
rigour to economics and, it is hoped, allowing the discipline to respond in a 
rational and humane way the next time a major crisis looms. 
 
Keywords. Nonlinearity, complexity, randomness, emergence. 
 
 
The CIFREM conference on nonlinearity, complexity and randomness took 
place at the University of Trento, Italy in October 2009, at the height of the 
financial crisis which was to lead most of the developed world into its most 
serious recession since the 1930’s. A degree of soul-searching has taken 
place within Economics since then. With some honourable exceptions very 
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few mainstream economists foresaw the crisis or, if they predicted its financial 
genesis, failed to predict the dire economic consequences which were to 
follow. Economists’ reactions have ranged from suggesting minor 
modifications to mainstream theory to completely rejecting it, and abandoning 
the Nobel Prize in Economics as an embarrassment to the profession (see 
Taleb, 2007). The context of this discussion is different from the crisis of the 
1930’s in that there is now a much wider public debate about economic 
problems and policy, a debate which has placed the Economics profession 
under close public scrutiny. Immediately before the Trento conference there 
was a public meeting in Bologna titled “Economists on Trial”. History does not 
relate whether they were found guilty. In fact the prosecution could have laid 
two separate but related charges: 
• The failure of mainstream economics to predict the banking crisis or to 
correctly analyse its relationship with the resulting recession. 
 
• The contribution of mainstream economics to the construction of exotic 
financial derivatives1 which were priced by mathematical models rather 
than by markets, and which played a central role in the failure of banks. 
 
Some mainstream economists (the “honourable exceptions” mentioned 
above) have expressed doubts about the direction much orthodox theory has 
taken and its increasing irrelevance to the analysis of the real world. In his 
blog “The unfortunate uselessness of most ’state of the art’ academic 
monetary economics” Willem Buiter (2009) comments: 
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“If one were to hold one’s nose and agree to play with the New 
Classical or New Keynesian complete markets toolkit, it would soon 
become clear that any potentially policy-relevant model would be highly 
non-linear, and that the interaction of these non-linearities and 
uncertainty makes for deep conceptual and technical problems. 
Macroeconomists are brave, but not that brave. So they took these 
non-linear stochastic dynamic general equilibrium models into the 
basement and beat them with a rubber hose until they behaved. This 
was achieved by completely stripping the model of its non-linearities 
and by achieving the transubstantiation of complex convolutions of 
random variables and non-linear mappings into well-behaved additive 
stochastic disturbances. 
 
Those of us who have marvelled at the non-linear feedback loops 
between asset prices in illiquid markets and the funding illiquidity of 
financial institutions exposed to these asset prices through mark-to-
market accounting, margin requirements, calls for additional collateral 
etc. will appreciate what is lost by this castration of the macroeconomic 
models. Threshold effects, critical mass, tipping points, non-linear 
accelerators - they are all out of the window. Those of us who worry 
about endogenous uncertainty arising from the interactions of 
boundedly rational market participants cannot but scratch our heads at 
the insistence of the mainline models that all uncertainty is exogenous 
and additive.” 
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The first lesson to draw from the current crisis within Economics is clearly that 
our models must embrace nonlinearity: linearised models with their 
saddlepoint dynamics and “jump variables” no longer serve any useful 
purpose (see George and Oxley, 1999 and 2008 for a detailed discussion of 
this point). Secondly, we need to revisit our analysis of randomness, 
uncertainty and rationality. The conference participants at Trento all 
addressed aspects of this agenda. They approached their topics from 
backgrounds in Economics, Physics, Computer Science and Philosophy, 
illustrating the Journal’s founding principle, namely the need to escape the 
spurious specialisation of Economics and learn from other disciplines.  
 
Discussion at the conference ranged from practical policy issues to 
methodological questions concerning the proper role for mathematical models 
in economics, and the appropriate type of mathematics upon which to base 
these models. Mainstream economists often justify their widespread use of 
mathematical modelling by appealing to the notion of intellectual “rigour”. But 
this demand for rigour is not usually taken far: ask most economists if they 
subscribe to the Zemelo-Frankel axioms or the Axiom of Choice and you will 
usually get a puzzled response. However, these concerns were central for the 
Trento conference participants: much of the discussion concerned the 
possibility of an algorithmic basis for economics, particularly for nonlinear 
dynamics, and the computability of economic models. A theme of the 
conference was that the foundations of economics need to be recast in 
algorithmic terms. Most mainstream economics rests on a relatively narrow 
range of (largely 19th century) mathematical techniques such as optimisation 
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and linear algebra. But the foundations of mathematics itself have long been 
the subject of intense scrutiny, though many mathematicians have thought it 
best to consign these discussions to the separate discipline of Logic. 
However, these ideas cannot be kept in their box, not least because Turing’s 
ideas and theorems (among others) have led directly to the 20th and 21st 
century revolution in computing. Ideas of computability, algorithms and 
constructive mathematics are now much more familiar than they were even 
thirty years ago. There are distinct potential advantages to be derived from 
developing algorithmic foundations for economics. For example, it would bring 
economic theory closer to the data against which theories must be tested, and 
hence closer to applied and policy analysis, which must be numerical and 
computational.  
 
The perspective outlined above has both micro and macro economic 
dimensions. At the micro level the economist turns to bounded rationality and 
agent-based modelling. At the macro level s/he focuses on the theory of 
nonlinear dynamical systems and coupled markets, to which economists such 
as Goodwin (1947) made so many prescient contributions. From this type of 
macro-modelling one would hope to derive macro-policy prescriptions better 
adapted to dealing with global macroeconomic crises than the present, 
obviously inadequate, policy regime. At both micro and macro level there lurks 
the ever-present methodological danger of “reverse engineering”. By this I 
mean deciding on an interesting or desirable outcome of a model and simply 
making the right assumptions to guarantee that outcome. It may not be 
necessary to (in Buiter’s words) “beat them with a rubber hose until they 
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behaved” but economic models are often forced into a Procrustean bed of 
highly implausible and misleading assumptions. This is a particular temptation 
in macroeconomics, where dynamical systems theory is employed. This 
theory puts the focus on the classification of attractors of dynamical systems. 
For example strange attractors, which generate chaotic motion have appealed 
to economists but, this approach presents the temptation to reverse-engineer 
one’s model in such a way as to generate the desired attractor. Concerns with 
the methodological unsoundness of this practice provide another reason to 
search for algorithmic foundations for nonlinearity, complexity and 
randomness.  
 
This discussion leads naturally to a consideration of “emergence”. Mainstream 
economics is characterised by a reductionist methodology. Macroeconomists 
are exhorted to provide “microeconomic foundations” for their models, an 
approach will yields some well-known conundrums. For example the 
microeconomists’ most general and “rigorous” model, General Equilibrium, 
has no room for money or for the firm, something of an obvious weakness. 
Moreover, why stop at microeconomics? Fodor (1974) describes an ‘immortal 
economist’ who vainly tries to derive economic principles from a knowledge of 
physics and the distribution of physical qualities in space-time.The ideas of 
the British Emergentists (Mill 1843, Broad, 1925 and Alexander 1920) have 
been given a new lease of life recently via the theory of nonlinear dynamical 
systems. Discussion at the Trento conference focussed on the idea that 
emergent behaviour can be defined as behaviour which arises in the transition 
between the computable and the non-computable. It would be reasonable to 
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conclude that macroeconomics should discard its reductionist methodology 
and focus on the relationship between nonlinearity, complexity and 
emergence. It is distinctly possible that Goodwin would have approved such a 
programme. Velupillai (“Nonlinear Dynamics, Complexity and Randomness: 
Algorithmic Foundations”, this volume) asks how emergent behaviour can be 
generated from a dynamical system. His answer is that emergent behaviour 
should be defined as “that exhibited by the behaviour of a dynamical system 
in its transition from one that is incapable of computation universality to one 
that is capable of such universal behaviour”. 
 
Nonlinearity, complexity and randomness are, for economists, inescapable. It 
has seemed to some that the present “rigorous” mathematisation of 
economics supplies a solid rock upon which to base their analysis and the 
policy prescriptions to which it leads. But “rigour” is a slippery concept and the 
basis of most mainstream economics is less solid rock, more shifting sands. 
Participants at the Trento conference, though disagreeing on many things, 
would probably argue that there is a way ahead, which puts economics and 
probability theory on an algorithmic basis, replacing sterile formalism with 
fertile formalism, and tackling seriously some of the methodological problems 
which have bedevilled economics. Let us hope that this work proceeds at a 
smart pace, so that next time a major crisis looms, economists have the tools 
to respond to it in a rational and humane way. 
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 Warren Buffet’s “weapons of financial mass destruction”. 
